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WOMAN BUILDS A NEW HOUSE:
- FAMILY LAW AFTER THE ERA
Denise Davis Schwartzman*
Every wise woman buildeth her house; but the
foolish plucketh it down with her hands.
Proverbs, 14:1
Introduction
Much of the controversy surrounding the passage of the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) is focused on domestic relations law. Women, the
argument goes, would lose all of the protections built into the Anglo-
American legal system for their benefit. These protections were designed
to secure the viability of the family unit by assuring that women could
safely continue in their roles as guardians of the family. Additionally,
these protections guaranteed that the hand that rocked the cradle would
not some day be outstretched for alms.
The law of domestic relations, when viewed in the narrow sense
to include only those laws which govern the family in its formation,
maintenance, and dissolution, does contain a network of inequalities
between the sexes. These inequalities may be seen by some as benefits
to women. However, the benefits were designed to balance the blatant
disabilities of women and particularly married women contained in the
other areas of the legal system, such as the law of torts, contracts,
real property, and probate.
This article will deal only with the narrow areas of family law--
marriage, divorce, alimony, child support and custody, paternity, and
adoption. All fifty states have specific legislation covering these
subjects. While many are similar, unless a Uniform Act is adopted, no
two are alike. No attempt at an exhaustive catalogue of the statutes
has been made. Instead, typical or illustrative statutes will be cited.
A.B., 1966, Temple University; LL.B., 1969, University of
Pennsylvania. Senior Attorney, Latin Americans Offices, Legal
Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Member, Florida and District of
Columbia Bar Associations.
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Even without the ERA, the modern trend has been towards family
laws that treat the spouses as equals. For example, the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act has adopted a completely sex-neutral approach to state
regulation of the formation and dissolution of the marriage contract. It
is assumed throughout that Courts in interpreting the ERA will insist that
legislation be sex-neutral, i.e. that sex will not be a factor. Sexual
classifications, like racial classifications, should be viewed with sus-
picion. This would, of course, include statutes that weigh unequally upon
men as well as upon women.
1
Family law as it developed solidified the customs of another age.
In many cases the customs have long since disappeared, but changes in
legislation tend to lag behind changes in public attitudes. Passage of
the ERA will afford to the states the well-needed opportunity to draft
comprehensive family codes which accurately reflect modern institutions
and mores.
THE BACKGROJND OF MODERN FAMILY LAW
At common law a married woman had no legal existence of her own.
The merger of her legal identity into that of her husband's was based
on the religious concept of unity of person. Her independent existence
was suspended during the period of the marriage. 2 As proof, the wife
took the husband's name. The husband took everything else.
The husband was the head of the family. He had the right to
chose the mode and the place of living for his family. He was entitled
to the use and occupation, as well as the rents and profits, from real
property owned by his wife during the marriage.3 Logic dictated that
there be imposed on him a corresponding duty to support and nurture his
wife and children.
The wife had the duty to follow her husband and make a home for
him providing those services generally referred to as consortium.4 Some
states have enshrined these ancient interpersonal (as distinguished
from property) rights into statute, and, in at least one of them, these
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relationships may not be altered by agreement of the parties.5 From this
venerable allocation of and duties, modern family law grew.
MARRIAGE
All state codes include legislation governing the formation of a
valid marriage contract. "Marriage being of vital public interest, is
subject to the state and to legislative power and control with respect
to its inception, duration and status, conditions and termination except
as restricted by Constitutional provisions. '6
The statutory requirements for a lawful marriage are simple.
Generally states require a license issued by a duly authorized officer,
a waiting period, a medical certificate, proof of age or written consent
of the parents, and a ceremony. States which do not require all of the
above typically dispense with the medical certificate or waiting period
or both.
These statutes are riddled with sexual classifications. Sex
bias begins with the act of applying for a marriage license, in that a
handful of states require that the application be made in the county
where the bride resides.8 Even the medical certificate, where required,
is not always free of sexual classifications. The State of Washington
requires that only men respond to questions about venereal disease.9
Colorado requires that only women be tested for rubella immunity. 10
While these two statutes involve sexual classifications, it is
clear that the ERA will forbid only the statute in Washington. There are
no significant differences in the abilityf the sexes to contract and
transmit venereal disease. The Washington statute is based on Victorian
precepts of female chastity. Obviously the wide public health benefit
to be served by premarital medical testing for venereal disease should
dictate that the Washington statute be extended to cover women to satisfy
the ERA.
On the other hand, the Colorado statute is legislation based on
a unique physical difference between the sexes. The connection between
rubella (German measles) contracted in the first three months of
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pregnancy and major birth defects, including blindness, deafness and
mental retardation, is a well established medical fact. Therefore, since.
women are the child-bearers, it is not a violation of the principle of
equal rights to require rubella tests for only women.
1 1
The most significant area of sex discrimination in the law of
marriage is found in those sections which prescribe the age at which
persons may marry. There are three relevant ages to be considered here:
the minimum age or the age below which a person cannot contract a valid
marriage; the age of parental consent or the age at which a valid marriage
can be contracted only if that the party has parental consent; and, the
age of independent consent when a valid marriage can be contracted on
one's own.
Typically the ages provided within this structure are lower for
women. A woman can contract a valid marriage at a younger age than a
man and she can marry wi-thout her parents consent at a younger age than
a man. For example, in Alabama no male below the age of seventeen and
no female below the age of fourteen can marry. A male between the ages
of seventeen and twenty-one can marry, provided his parents consent,
and a female between the ages of fourteen and eighteen can marry,
provided she has her parents' consent. Males over age twenty-one and
females over age eighteen can marry without this permission.
1 2
The age differentials stem from ancient notions of puberty and
maturity. At common law females at age twelve and males fourteen were
deemed capable of contracting and consumating a valid marriage.
13
Although modern statutes establish ages that bear very little relation
to puberty or the ability to consumate a marriage, a 1967 survey of the
state marriage laws conducted by the Department of Labor showed that only
ten states set the same minimum age for marriage for both sexes and only
eighteen set the same age of independent consent.
14
There has been little change in the minimum age requirements
since 1967. However, in response to the lowered voting age, many
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states have passed statutes and constitutional amendments providing
that persons both male and female shall reach their majority at age
eighteen. Consequently, about one half of the states now permit anyone
over eighteen to marry without parental consent.
1 5
This change--occurring independently of the ERA--is illustrative
of the modern trend in family law to treat the spouses as equals.'
6
The ERA will accelerate this trend by requiring that states equalize
the age breakdown. States may either lower the ages for males, raise
the ages for females, or fix an age between the current two ages as
applicable for both.
An unusual and severely harsh statute is found in a few states.
This satute provides that a male may not marry if he has been the inmate
of an insane asylum or a home for the indigent within the five years
immediately past, unless it can be established that he will be able to
support a family. I 7 This statute is based on an outdated view of the
roles of husband and wife and would be stricken by the ERA.
The prize for the worst statute goes to New Hampshire. New
Hampshire provides that no woman under the age of forty-five with a
history of mental disease or disorder, or no man of any age (unless
marrying a woman over forty-five) who has a history of mental disease
or disorder, may marry unless first sterilized (or permitted by the
Board of Health).1 8 This statute is apparently sex-neutral since it
ties its sexual classifications to the biological ability to reproduce.
No comment is offered on the statute's ability to withstand Constitutional
tests on other grounds.
GRCJNDS FOR DIVORCE
There is no common-law of divorce. Anglo-Saxon law, which
governed pre-2hristian Britain, permitted divorce by mutual consent or
on the grounds of the wife's adultery or desertion. The religious
conversion of Britain brought with it the concept of marriage as a
sacrament, and divorce as we know it disappeared until 1857. The
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American colonies passed statutes to provide for civil divorce in their
codes. Consequently, the modern grounds for divorce are purely
statutory.19
The grounds provided by statute differ widely from state to state.
Except where the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has been adopted, no
two state statutes are alike. The grounds provided in the Uniform Act
are entirely sex-neutral. The only ground for divorce is that "the
marriage is irretrievably broken."
2 0
States statutes following the old fault concept generally
catalogue widely varying lists of conjugal wrongs which define the grounds
for divorce. Very often included among these are sex-biased grounds.
The sex-bias in these statutes stems from an outdated view of the roles
of husband and wife. The laws then seek to define what constitutes
culpable behavior in a marriage on the basis of this outdated view.
In surveying the state statutes there is an important distinction
to be made between those grounds which appear with numerical frequency
among the codes and those grounds which actually represent a major
focal point for divorce litigation under the fault concept. In other
words, although a particular ground may appear in almost all the fault-
type statutes, complaints for divorce alleging that particular ground
may in fact occur quite infrequently.2 1 With this distinction in mind,
it becomes highly unlikely that even the most commonly encountered
sex-biased grounds for divorce represent a significant portion of
overall divorce litigation.
The most common sex-biased ground for divorce is the failure
of the husband to support his wife when able to do so. 2 2 Without a
corresponding ground for divorce to enable a husband to sue for non-
support, these statutes would not survive a test under the ERA.
S~cond to nonsupport in numerical frequency as a fault -type
ground divorce is the pregnancy of the wife by a man other than the
husband at the time of the marriage.23 This statute poses more complex
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problems of analysis under the ERA. There is no doubt a moral element
here reflecting older views of female premarital unchastity which con-
stituted at least one justification for this statute. If morality
alone were the rationale, clearly this statute would fail any court
test under the ERA.
However, a challenge to this statute under the ERA would strike
from the very heart of equal rights. No state grants to a wife a
corresponding ground for divorce on finding that her husband fathered
a child prior to the marriage. No doubt this disparity grew out of
the differing obligations and duties that husband or wife would have
under a pre-ERA legal system with regard to children conceived out of
wedlock by the opposite spouse. A wife would have no legal obligations
at all towards offspring fathered by her husband outside her marital
union.
The husband on the other hand might very well be obligated to
support the child which he did not father during the entire period
of its minority since children born of a marriage are presumptively
legitimate.2 4 The ERA would under its best interpretation not permit
such a widely disparate view of obligations based on nothing more than
traditional sex roles. There is no reason why a woman should not be
equally obligated to provide for the separate children of her spouse
under the same conditions as her husband would be.
The balance of the sex-biased grounds for divorce are insignificant
numerically and probably inconsequential judicially. They do however
have a certain historical interest. Montana, for example, permits a
wife to divorce a husband who has repeatedly made false accusations
against her chastity, without a corresponding ground to afford relief
to a husband whose honor has been called into question by his wife.2 5
Virginia allows a husband to divorce his wife on the ground of her
prostitution prior to the marriage if it were not known to him at the
time of the marriage. No corresponding ground is provided for the wife.
26
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Somewhere short of absolute divorce is the ancient remedy of
divorce a mensa et thoro, or divorce from bed and board. When divorce
a vinculo was unobtainable at law, the Ecclesiastical Courts of England
devised this half-way solution to marital problems. An action for divorce
a mensa et thoro produced an adjudication of the support and custody
obligations of the parties and an authorization for husband and wife
to live separate and apart. It did not of course permit the parties to
remarry.
27
Although the modern trend is to dispense with this remedy entirely,
28
the remedy does still exist in most states. Typically the grounds for
divorce from bed and board follow the grounds for absolute divorce.
The most significant sex bias in this otherwise significant area is
that in some states only a wife may bring such an action.29 If these
statutes are to continue in force, then clearly the ERA will require
a cause of action to be granted regardless of sex.
CUSTODY OF CILDREN
The law governing the custody of minor children is heavily sex-
biased in favor of women. The issue of child custody is most frequently
tried in marital litigation. When a custody contest involves a natural
parent (of either sex) and a third party (of either sex) the universal
rule is to favor the natural parents. 30  The sex-Has assumes an im-
portant, if nor pivotal position, when the contest for custody is between
a husband and a wife.
The preference for mothers in child custody cases turns the
ancient common-law precepts upside down. At common-law a father had
a nearly absolute right to the custody of his minor children. He was
entitled to their earnings and society. The law viewed them as his
property. A father could be deprived of his right to custody only
where he was corrupt or represented a danger to the child.
The preference for the mother is a judicial creation since
most custody statutes are couched in sex-neutral language.3 1 Some
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states statutes clearly announce their sex bias. 32 However, this is
the exception and not the rule. The judicial preference for mothers in
custody cases is so strong that it really is a rule of law. One
survey showed that in ninety percent of all custody cases the mother was
awarded custody.33  If the survey had been expanded to include un-
contested divorces where husbands simply acquiesced without a contest,
the proportion of custody awards to mothers would no doubt soar higher
still.
Florida law presents a good example of the development of the
rule of preference for the mother. Florida originally followed the
common law rule that a father had a superior right to the custody of
his children. This rule was abolished by judicial decision in 1941. 34
The Florida Court began instead to ask the question of how the best
interests of the child were to be served. Cases applying the "best
kterests of the child" standard repeatedly ruled that the best interests
of the child would be served by placement with the mother. This in-
terpretation of the standard became a firmly entrenched rule of law.
The result was a rule in Florida that a mother was presumptively entitled
to custody of minor children unless she was found to be unfit.35
In 1971 Florida adopted a local version of the Uniform Marriage
Act's sex-neutral custody section. However, it was clear that a sex-
neutral custody statute alone would be insufficient to redress the
imbalance in light of the state's case law. Therefore the legislature
went further and added, "Upon considering all relevant factors, the father
of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in
determining custody."
'36
The ERA should have the effect of extending the Florida rule
across the nation. The present sex-neutral statutes found in the majority
of the state codes can remain unchanged. What will be changed are
the judicial presumptions and constructions that interpret these
statutes. Courts will be called upon to consider all relevant factors
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rather than myths, prejudices and customs.
The law of child custody, perhaps more than any other area, points
out the need for a new analysis of legal relationships defined by family
law. The best interpretation of the ERA would require a careful look
at the reality of a given family situation. Judges and legislators must
not be allowed to rely on social customs as a subterfuge for preserving
the ancient aid often outworn legal relationships that the ERA seEs to
overturn.
Courts must make the distinction, for example, between child
bearing and child rearing. The former is a unique physical characteristic
of the female. The latter is a social responsibility discharged best
when shared by male and female, but dischargeable by either male or female
alone should the necessity arise. There is no logic or justification
for Courts ruling that the best interests of the child are always served
by placement with the mother.
CHILD SUPPORT
Common-law imposed upon the father the duty to support his children.
His support obligations were the natural corollary of his rights as
natural custodian and guardian of his offspring. All American jurisdictions
follow the common-law rule to the extent of laying the primary duty of
child support before the male.
3 7
The common hw rule solidified the tradition-honored view of the
male--that of provider for his family. So thoroughly entrenched is this
construct of the family that all child support statutes in some way
reflect its existence and proceed to sex-bias thereby. The ERA will
only realize sex-neutral child support laws when the traditional view
of the male role is disregarded completely.
The criminal law represents the harshest means through which
the states seek to impose sex roles upon individuals. All states make
it a crime for a father not to support his children. Some state codes
are completely silent on the mother's support obligations. Most states
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do make it a crime for a mother to fail to support her children but usually
with qualifications.
3 8
The Model Penal Code attempts to provide a sex-neutral criminal
support statute, but fails because it defines the duty to support a
dependent with reference to a legal obligation to provide for that de-
pendent. 39 If the legal obligation to support a dependent comes from
the common law, then the statute is sex biased and must fail the test
under the ERA.
The adjudication of the obligation to support one's children occurs
most frequently not in the criminal courts but in the civil courts in
actions for divorce or separate maintenance. Originally the civil statutes
providing for child support followed the common law model and placed
primary liability on the father. Some still do. 40  However, following
the modern trend to treat the spouses as equals in family litigation, many
states have passed what purport to be sex-neutral provisions as part of these
divorce codes.
These statutes may fail the test ofsex-neutrality in the same
manner as the Model Penal Code. The Florida statute, for example, reads:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the Court may at
any time order either or both parents owing a duty of support
to a child of the marriage to pay such support . ... 41
The question to be decided in determining the Constitutionality
of these statutes under the ERA, will be "Where is the referenced duty
defined?" If the duty descends from the uneven obligation imposed by
the common law or the state criminal law, then these modern statutes
too must fail.
Perhaps the easiest and most satisfactory solution to the problem
presented by the modern statutes would be a simple declaration, either
legislative or judicial, that men and women are equally obligated to
support their children and that only inability relieves one of that
obligation.
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INTERSPCQJSAL SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
The legal duty of the spouses to support one another, like the
duty of parents to support their children, derives from the common law
definitions of familial obligations. Again, just as with child support,
the duty of interspousal support is enforced through coexistent civil
and criminal support statutes in the state codes.
Courts generally do not interfere with the financial arrangements
of an on-going family unit.42 Therefore, the question of the spouses'
duty to support one another is most frequently tried as an adjunct to
marital litigation when the family unit has broken down. Although all
states have criminal nonsupport statutes, the most important legal method
for enforcing inter-spousal support obligations is in civil litigation
for divorce or separate maintenance.
The civil support obbligation--alimony--grew out of the recognition
by the Ecclesiastical Courts of a man's duty to support his wife.
Alimony descends from the support awards granted in actions for divorce
a mensa et thoro.43 These support awards were and still are in addition
to outright grants of property. All states provide for some form of
alimony award to a wife on the dissolution of the marriage.
44
Because a wife had no common law duty to support her husband,
there is no similar award to a husband unless specifically authorized
by statute.45 The theory of alimony is that it enables the wife to stay
home and care for young children even where the children are the subject
of a separate divorce decree. In cases where there were no children,
alimony insured that the wife did not have to turn to the public for
support. The idea was to maintain the family with minimum social and
economic disruption from the dissolution of the marital union.
46
The theory perhaps made sense in a different age when the marital
unit rarely consisted of two working partners or when a woman's earnings
rarely constituted a significant portion of the family's income.
However, even under the older economic structure, the theory of maintaining
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one who could not maintain herself was not often carefully followed.
In practice, awards of alimony are tied to the wife's behavior
during the marriage. In some jurisdictions a wife will be awarded alimony
only if she is found by the Court to be free of fault for the marital
breakdown.47 The reward and punishment aspect of alimony alone would
seem to be sufficient reason to overhaul the institution, but the ERA
will not necessarily eliminate this aspect of the law of alimony.
The ERA will eliminate those alimony laws which favor one spouse
over the other in defining inter-spousal support obligations. The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act 48 is a good model for states to follow. The
Uniform Act views the family as an economic unit that received income
and contributions of varying kinds and fixes post-marital obligations on
an assessment of that particular economic unit. Fault is specifically
not a relevant consideration. The relevant considerations, which are
enumerated in the Act, include the financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, the time necessary to acquire the education or
training to become self-supporting, the standard of living during the
marriage, the duration of the marriage, the age and emotional stability
of the party seeking maintenance, and the ability of the other party
to pay.
There is a pervasive air of days-gone-by surrounding the statutes
which define the criminal penalties for failure to support a spouse.
All states make it a crime for a man to fail to support his wife. A
typical nonsupport statute will generally make it a crime for a man
to fail to support his wife and children and a crime for a woman to
fail to support her children. 49 Where a wife is criminally liable for
the nonsupport of her husband, the liability is generally qualified to
include only those husbands who are incapacitated or infirm.50
Moreover, there is a strong implication in many of the statutes
that the wife need not seek employment even to support an infirm husband.
The Oklahoma statute is an interesting example. Oklahoma provides
that a husband must support his wife out of his separate property, the
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community property, or by his labor. A wife on the other hand must support
a husband only out of her separate property or the community property
and then only when the husband is infirm and has no estate of his own.
5 1
The extremely uneven support obligations found in the majority
of the states will simply not withstand a test under the ERA. If criminal
nonsupport statutes are to be kept, they must define obligations on the
basis of the economic reality of the family unit. As with child support
statutes, tradition-worn customs and sex roles cannot be permitted as
the starting premise or else the vhole purpose of ERA will be subverted.
PATERNITY AND ADOPTION
The most poignant sex discrimination in the family laws of the
states falls not upon women but upon men. A man who tries to assert his
rights to a child fathered by him out of wedlock will find himself very
often without any legal means available to protect his claim to a legal
relationship.
The laws of paternity and bastardy are of ancient lineage. An
illegitimate child was defined at common law as a child born and be-
gotten out of wedlock.5 2 The status of the child deemed illegitimate was
so completely disabling that the law indulged every possible presumption
of legitimacy. The child born of a valid marriage was therefore nearly
always held legitimate.
5 3
However, once the child was born to an unmarried woman the
status of illegitimacy was irrevocably conferred upon it. The child was
filius nuluis, child of nobody; and short of an act of the sovereign,
there was no legal mechanism for legitimation. The child and the father
enjoyed no rights in one another's society or property.
Later as the law developed, a putative father could be compelled
to support the child. As early as 1576 the Elizabethan Poor Laws
created a bastardy proceeding which judicially established filiation
between father and child and compelled the father to support the child.
5 5
Modern paternity proceedings descend from the old bastardy proceedings.
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They are civil or quasi-criminal in nature. The important aspect of
these statutes is that the mother or the state is the moving party. In
states that follow this model, there is no other judicial proceeding through
which a father can affirmatively establish his paternity.
5 6
The harshness of the common law rule that forever conferred the
status of illegitimacy upon a child has been alleviated somewhat by modern
law. All states now hold that the subsequent intermarriage of the mother
and father legitimates the child. 5 7 Some states provide that acknowledgement
or recognition of the child will legitimate it. 5 8 After the child is
legitimated, the legal relationship is that of parent and child.
Analysis of these statutes reveals that what was once intended
as a protection now remains as a serious disability. No doubt the strict
rules for legitimation were intended, at least in part, to protect innocent
men from claims being laid to their names and estates by immoral women.
The result is that in most jurisdictions a putative father has no legal
right to his child at all even though the relationship with the mother
and the child had more closely approximated a family unit than a casual
illicit liason.
Nowhere is this disability more evident than in the adoption
laws. All states require the consent of both parents, or a legal
equivalent thereof, before a legitimate child can be placed for adoption.
However, for an illegitimate child in the majority of the states, the
consent of the mother alone is sufficient. In other words, even though
a man and a woman have maintained a stable family unit for a period of
time, and even though the father supported and acknowledged the child
or children as his own, the mother's consent alone would be legally
sufficient to sever all family ties between parent and child.59
Those states which do require the consent of the father fall
into two major groupings: those which require a father's consent where
paternity has been established by a juJicial proceeding,6 0 and those
which require consent if the child has been legitimated.6 1 The inherent
disabilities in both these patterns of statutes are clear. In the former,
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if the state follows the model of the old bastardy proceeding, then
there is no way for the father affirmatively to establish filiation
judicially. In the latter, if the state does not provide for legitimation
through acknowledgement or recognition, the father as a practical matter
may be foreclosed from legitimating the child if intermarriage is im-
possible or even undesirable. Only one state requires the consent of
the putative father.
62
The ERA will remove those disabilities found in these statutes
that are based entirely upon sex. The traditional justifications will
clearly be invalid. There is no valid reason to deny to a father an
affirmative right of action to establish his paternity.63 A good model
for such a statute can be found in Nevada where in 1969 the legislature
created an "Action to Establish Parental Relationship" which is designed
to establish filiation. The same nature of proof is available to a
father in such a proceeding as to a mother in a bastardy pmceeding.64
There is of course, a balance to be struck whenever the interests
of an innocent child would be the major focus of post-ERA legislation.
However, if the ERA has its desired effect and customary and traditional
views are no longer the a priori of all child-oriented legislation,
then the states can devise sex neutral legal mechanisms through which
the real interests of a putative father can be protected.
MISCELLANEOUS DISCRIMINATIONS
The traditional area of the law of domestic relations contains
various other discriminations that will be overturned by the ERA.
a. Name. In all states a woman upon her marriage takes her
husband's name. This loss of identity comes from the ancient doctrine
of unity of person.65 The ERA will, of course, have to overturn this
ancient rule. The state may have a legitimate interest in requiring
family units to carry the same surname; however, this interest would
not extend to requiring that the name carried be that of the husband.
The easiest way to deal with this change would be to allow the couple to
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choose a name and register the new name at the same time the marriage
is recorded.
b. Domicile.' At common law the domicile of the wife followed
that of the husband. He had the right to chose the place of abode, and the
wife had to follow if the choice was reasonable.6 6 A wife's failure to
accompany her husband was viewed in most jurisdictions as desertion giving
grounds for a divorce action.6 7  A post-ERA law of domicile will of course,
discard the common law rule. There is no rational sex-neutral basis to
assume that a wife must follow her husband. Where the concept of domicile
remains important for other legal consequences, the Courts can apply the
more meaningful test of actual contacts with the jurisdiction.
c. Emancipation. Almost all states provide that a single man
and woman reach their majority at the same age. 6 8  However, many states
also provide that marriage emancipates a minor. 6 9 Therefore, if the
marriage age is lower for women, as it usually is, then a woman can also
be emancipated at a younger age. This sex-biased disability will of course
disappear when the disparate marriage ages disappear.
CONCUJ SION
The Equal Rights Amendment will indeed build a new legal house
for women. In the area offamily law the changes may be much farther
reaching on paper than they are in fact. This is an area where custom,
tradition, and social convention have a much more direct and immediate
effect on individual then legislation. Most people will chose to and
follow the model of the family that they have learned from their parents.
The importance of the ERA is that these customs, traditions,
and social conventions will no longer be the law. The accent will be
on choice. Legislation which attempts to force people or institutions
into traditional or customary sex roles will no longer be valid.
Individuals and family units will be able to develop and grow
along the lines most satisfactory to them. When they must intersect with
the laws of the State, then those laws will view the unit as a functional
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entity, in terms of its own social and economic realities.
The ERA does not, as its most ardent disclaimers asserted,
spell the end of the family as we know it. What it does spell the end to
are serious legal disabilities that have no logical relationship to the
modern family. It is no surprise to the student of family law that these
disabilities weigh heavily on men and women. A sex-neutral family code
is a legitimate goal soon to be realized under the ERA.
-63-
FOOTNOTES
1. For a good discussion of possible interpretation of the ERA,
see The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L. J., 871 (Apr. 1971).
2. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 422 (Cooley
ed. 1884).
3. C. Moynihan, Law of Real Property, 52 (1962). The ancient property
rights of the husband have now been almost entirely abolished
by the Married Women's Property Acts. See Moynihan, supra, at
233.
4. Consortium is generally defined as love, affection, companionship,
society, and sexual relations. See Karczewski v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company, 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967.
5. See, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3103.02, 3103.06 (Page 1963); Okla.
Stats. Anno. 9§ 32-2 (West 1971); S.D. Comp. Laws 9 25-2-2 (1967).
6. Light v. Mequinniss, 156 Fla. 61, 22 So. 2d 455, 456 (1945).
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